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FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS TO GUIDE POLITICS AND POLICY

America, the Republican
Nation: A Response to
Critics of the Nation-State
Bernard Dobski

D

edication to America’s national form is not about the thoughtless
valorizing of one’s own that is so often at the heart of uglier forms
of nationalism. It is about an understanding of the critical role played by size,
scope, and dimensionality in the creation of stable and secure communities, the
emergence of a citizenry attached to the public good, the rule of reasoned law,
the preservation of diversity and minorities, and political transparency and
accountability, the very things that critics of the nation tacitly seek to preserve.
Critics of the national form thus fail to appreciate the conditions necessary to
preserve the rights they claim to cherish. They also fail to understand that the
ability to grasp the virtues of the national form, defend their preservation, and
respect their power does not require being a liberal or a conservative. Nor does
it require a chauvinistic defense of America’s past, or even patriotism. It simply
requires an openness to the axioms of the new science of civic republicanism and
the ability to see that the type of regime that is desired will determine certain features that it must entail in order for it to exist and persevere. To be sure, America
has been indispensable to the cause of human liberty at home and abroad over
the past two centuries. But it is its science of civic republicanism—the self-conscious articulation of this political physics—as much as its unique history, that
makes America such an indispensable nation.
Once considered by many to be indispensable to the cause of human
liberty, America today is attacked as the bulwark of atavistic politics that
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clings to a dark and unjust past, impeding the confident march of human
progress. These attacks are directed at America’s national form, understood
as a defined, bordered, and discrete community dedicated to the common
good of a particular and exclusive citizen body.
The ancient Greeks identified two political forms: the city and the empire.
The city, cradle of free political life, was small and vulnerable to factionalism, while the empire, despotic in nature, offered safety and stability by
virtue of its massive size. America’s Founders introduced something novel
to this tradition by developing the justification of a third distinct political
form: the nation-state. As understood and developed by the Founders, the
nation-state embodies the heart of American exceptionalism: It secures
both popular liberty and the stability and security so necessary to all free
communities.
Contrary to the charges so often leveled against America, a defense of our
national form such as one finds in the Federalist Papers is rooted neither in
a patriotic jingoism nor in a tribal love of one’s own. Rather, the national
form is recommended by the iron-clad laws of republican self-government:
America’s unique ability to provide stability and safety; a citizenry actuated
by a love of the common good; the rule of law rooted in rational reflection;
the protection of minorities (understood here in the classical sense as those
whose political and ideological views fall outside the majority); the promotion of regional and economic diversity; and the conditions required for
political transparency and accountability is rooted in its form as a specifically republican nation.
Behind the contemporary attack on the national form is a pathology that
the late Roger Scruton called oikophobia, literally “fear of home,” or the
“repudiation of inheritance and home.”1 Today, “oikophobes” attack America
from two distinctive perspectives, what I classify as “from without” and
“from within.” Those who attack America “from without” advocate for global
humanitarianism and thus look down on national borders as roadblocks to
the fullest realization of liberalism’s promise—a unified humanity. Those
who attack it “from within” tend to criticize the nation as the source of social,
economic, and political systems that oppress the marginalized. Members of
the latter group tend to be advocates of identity politics. While the global
humanitarian looks to a borderless world in which we can enjoy the unimpeded exercise of an ever-expanding list of individual and communal rights
(many of which often conflict with each other), the identitarian retreats

1.

Roger Scruton, England and the Need for Nations, (London: Civitas, 2004), p. 36.
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from the broader ideals embodied by the nation and the responsibilities
imposed by nations into ever smaller sub-national groups defined by race,
ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation. But in attacking the nation, these
critics would undo the very things they want to preserve by undermining
the political conditions necessary to safeguarding the particular rights they
claim to cherish.
Today, such oikophobes are all over our political landscape. Much
of the academy, for example, is devoted to describing the history of the
nation-state as one drenched in unjust wars, imperialism, slavery, genocide, racism, sexism, and xenophobia. Open-border advocates claim that
national sovereignty inhibits the free flow of goods and peoples so crucial
to the accumulation of wealth and prosperity, and thereby prevents the
flourishing of all human beings around the globe. And, perhaps most importantly, members of our political class tell us with increasing frequency that
national forms, whose borders are the product of accident and force, are by
definition arbitrary, particular, and exclusive, and therefore unjust. President Barack Obama himself famously stated that he considered America to
be an exceptional nation in much the same way that the British considered
Britain exceptional, the Greeks considered Greece exceptional, and so on.2
In other words, America is not so special after all; national identity is just
about loving one’s own in the same way that others are partial to their own.
One antidote to this oikophobia lies in recovering the Federalists’ appreciation of the iron-clad laws of political liberty. This recovery requires
acknowledging that the insights of the Federalists into the fundamental
dynamics of free political life precede the race- and language-based defenses
of the natio put forward by German and French thinkers in the late 18th
and early 19th centuries. Modern thinking about the national form has its
origins not in racism, ethnicity, or xenophobia, as both globalist and identitarian allege, but in the science of civic republicanism.3 The ability to see
the wisdom of this science does not make one a conservative or a liberal;
neither does it make one a vulgar populist or an ethnic chauvinist.
What unites Americans, more than any ethnic, linguistic, economic, or
religious similarities that we might share, are those noble principles and

2.

News conference, Barack Obama, Palais de la Musique et des Congrès, Strasbourg, France, April 4, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/news-conference-president-obama-4042009 (accessed December 10, 2019).

3.

In referring to a science of civic republicanism, I am drawing on Madison’s reference in Federalist Paper No. 9 to the improvements in the “science of
politics” made by Montesquieu and, by extension, the Federalists themselves. The republican conclusions drawn from this science of politics follow
from the Federalists’ rich study of political history, informed by their reading of political philosophy, and tempered by their own direct experience
of republican and non-republican political alternatives. They believed that their insights, reflected in the proposed Constitution and communicated
through the Federalist Papers, amounted to genuine, previously unknown discoveries about politics on the level of objective science.
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self-evident truths, held in common, and articulated and defended by the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. And while animated
by a love for the universal principles informing our Founding documents,
our nation is—as are all successful nations based on the laws of free politics—grounded in a particular hearth and home, creating a people with
common territory, customs, laws, and mores. The subsequent history of our
national community testifies to the blessings that this distinctive blending
of universal and particular affords our citizens, as well as to the considerable
dangers that come with abandoning it. The national form—and America as
the republican embodiment of that form—offers the best means for realizing
human flourishing, justice, and prosperity in our world.

Our New Form of Politics
Alexander Hamilton opens the first Federalist Paper by posing an age-old
political problem: Will men be able to govern themselves through rational
reflection and choice, or will they forever be ruled by accident and force?4
For most of history, nations were based on accident and force; here, however,
was an opportunity to build a nation based on reason, to design a nation on
the basis of a new science of politics. Though he does not openly state it as
his intention, Hamilton’s “republican” argument effectively presents one
of the first defenses of the nation as a political form.
As Hamilton elaborates in Federalist Paper No. 9, the republican form must
be larger than the states constituting it and smaller than an empire whose
vast range demands a monarchy. Hamilton’s emphasis on the novelty of this
arrangement above all the other innovations of the new science of politics
indicates his awareness of the paucity of prior theorizing about the nation. This
point cannot be overstated. Between the writings of Cicero5 and the work of
Montesquieu6 and Jean-Jacques Rousseau,7 reflection on the proper size and
scope of a political community, a tradition whose origins can be found in Aristotle’s
Politics,8 is noticeably absent in the Western political and philosophic traditions.

4.

Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, No. 1, The Avalon Project, Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_
century/fed01.asp (accessed December 10, 2019).

5.

Marcus Tullius Cicero, “On the Republic” and “On the Laws,” trans. and with introduction, notes, and indexes by David Fott (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2014).

6.

Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu, 4 vols. (London: T. Evans, 1777), https://oll.libertyfund.
org/titles/montesquieu-complete-works-4-vols-1777 (accessed May 21, 2020).

7.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. and introduction by Maurice Cranston (London: Penguin Classics, 2003).

8.

Aristotle, The Politics, trans. and introduction by Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). See especially Book 7, chs. 4–8 (on the
proper size of a city’s population, 7.4; its territory, 7.5; its relationship to the sea, 7.6; and the character of its people, 7.7).

FIRST PRINCIPLES | No. 79
heritage.org



Of course, this does not mean that nations did not come into existence
in the intervening millennia and a half. Long before the Treaty of Westphalia legitimized the boundaries that would define the birth of European
nations in 1648, national communities had been coalescing along linguistic,
cultural, ethnic, religious, economic, and geographical lines. But Western
political thought had abandoned a critical part of the intellectual patrimony
it received from the Greeks and Romans. It no longer felt the need to deliberate over the formal pre-conditions necessary to fulfill man’s nature as a
political being. The reasons behind this lengthy silence are, at least, two-fold.
First, Aristotle recognized the existence of only two forms that expressly
political life could take: the city (or polis) and the empire. Any other human
associations, such as the family, the household, the village, or even economic and military alliances between cities, were deemed sub-political.
Because of their small size, these associations were limited in their aims
and deliberations to the material conditions necessary to sustain life; all
considerations of justice or virtue were subordinated to the near constant
focus on the needs of daily life. The larger size of the city and the empire, by
contrast, freed people from the constant focus on self-defense and securing
the conditions of mere life. Reasonably assured of their self-preservation,
people in these communities were free to inquire into what it would mean
to live well or nobly.
And yet, of these two forms, it was the city that made it possible for a large
portion of its citizens to contribute meaningfully to the decisions of their
community. For while empires kept their subjects safe and secure, their
sheer size required that they be governed despotically. The city, by contrast,
had to be large enough to be self-sufficient, but small enough to be easily
seen and traversed. Within these confines one could reasonably be expected
to know every other citizen. And meaningful public deliberation among
citizens can only take place in a setting where citizens know, trust, and care
for one another. In the narrower confines of the city, men can exercise the
rational faculty (which defines their humanity) and deliberate together
over what constitutes a just, free, and noble way of life. For Aristotle, it is
this end that justifies the city’s distinctive form.9
Second, while the city’s size made it ideal for the cultivation of free politics, it also exposed it to the threats posed by factionalism and rival cities
of comparable size. The ancient city thus was at constant risk of civil war
from within and invasion from without. And historically speaking, the city

9.

Aristotle, The Politics, 1.2.
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was crushed as a viable political form by the spread of the Roman Empire
and the subsequent rise of the Catholic Church.10 The successful political
and spiritual universalisms of these two world-shaping forces not only
demonstrated the ultimate fragility of the polis but also obviated any serious discussion regarding the legitimacy of more limited, subordinate, and
parochial political forms. There was no incentive for students of political
theory to pursue recreating the city.
The Renaissance, and the rebirth of secular humanism that came in its
wake, changed this. The rediscovery of the glories of ancient Greece and
Rome issued in the spirited effort to recover a version of classical republicanism, that is, a politics ordered around and centered in the people
and their concerns for an ordered liberty under the law. Naturally, such
a political arrangement required returning political power to the people
themselves. And this meant constricting the realm of politics and government to that much smaller space in which individuals could reasonably
exercise the levers of healthy and free political life on their own.
The reorientation of political life around the concerns of the individual,
as opposed to the demands of throne and altar, did not, however, result
in a renewed discussion of political forms. That discussion was delayed
because the leading Enlightenment thinkers asserted a new understanding
of human nature as the basis of political life, one that emphasized individual
rights as the basis of laws and duties. Whereas the laws and duties of crown
and church imposed obligations on individuals, the new theory of individual
rights focused on liberties, and expanding the space of permissible individual activity. What came to matter was not what you owe others, but what
others owe you. By prioritizing the freedom of the individual to act as he
or she wants, Enlightenment theorists advanced a teaching in tension with
the legitimacy of external limits on freedom. Moreover, because individual
rights are universal to all human beings, allegedly realizable in a community
of any size, there seemed to be no reason why anyone who accepted the
validity of the arguments for natural rights would ever need to think about
the proper political forms necessary for realizing and defending those rights.
It thus fell to The Federalist to provide the reasoned defense of a political community that could navigate the Scylla of the unstable city and the
Charybdis of monarchical empire, a defense that had been missing from
Western political thought for over fifteen hundred years. And the authors
of The Federalist were able to resurrect this long-neglected discussion

10. See for example, Pierre Manent, A World Beyond Politics? A Defense of the Nation State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
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because they did not draw their political wisdom exclusively from the more
abstract rights theory of Enlightenment thinkers. The Federalists’ political
sensibilities were also informed by Christianity, with a gaze elevated to the
sacred and divine, and classical republicanism, with its intense focus on the
size and structure of a political community, giving them an appreciation
for forces that were more elemental, and thus more authoritative, in the
formation of political communities than the civic rights of the individual.
They were more sensitive to the preconditions, the foundations on which
a community dedicated to individual rights must be built.
For these reasons, modern reflection on the forms necessary to preserving republican liberty, though initiated by Montesquieu, finds its earliest
thoughtful expression in our Federalist Papers. This work constitutes a
remarkable (and remarkably underappreciated) contribution to the history
of political thought on the subject of political forms. Indeed, it remains
arguably one of the Federalists’ most important, and again, most underappreciated, contributions to Western political philosophy. Thanks to them,
we can now add the nation as the third political form to those of the city
and the empire.

The Iron-Clad Laws of Free Politics
Of course, to credit the authors of the Federalist Papers with a defense of
one of only three political forms is to recognize that for them, like Aristotle,
political life is profoundly limited: It is not open to unlimited permutations
or perpetual progress. These limits are set by certain iron-clad laws of free
politics, laws rooted in the basic dynamics of political life and set by man’s
finite nature.
Generally speaking, the Federalists understood that the welfare of the
community is best served when its citizens know, trust, have affection for,
and understand each other. They also knew that a human being can only
know well a limited number of human beings, that powerful attachments of
the human heart are therefore restricted to a precious few, and that trust is
always in short supply. This insistence on the significance to healthy politics
of knowing, loving, and trusting others, and on the limits of these, provides
us with the sharpest point of difference between The Federalists’ defense of
a particular, bounded, political community, and the contemporary critics
who view national limits as anathema to the fullest and freest unfolding of
the human personality.
The first iron-clad law concerns the importance of a political form’s size
to its internal freedom and its external stability. After cataloguing the many

June 2020 | 7
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aids to political liberty innovated or perfected by the new science of politics,
Hamilton ventures to add what is perhaps the most novel contribution to the
freedom of the republican order, one which the new Constitution embodies
most fully: “the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such systems
are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single State, or to the
consolidation of several smaller States into one great Confederacy.”11
What makes such an orbital expansion novel? Hamilton illustrates the
necessity of a confederation of republics to the young nation’s ability to
ensure its safety and, most importantly for our purposes, retain its republican character. A large confederacy of states makes it increasingly unlikely
that foreign states will tempt fortune by attacking it unprovoked or that
domestic insurrections will consume the union before other members can
effectively respond. Moreover, because it rests upon the modified sovereignty of its member states, all of which are republican, such a confederacy
can expand in size without surrendering its republican character to monarchical temptations. Historically, the united confederacies that preceded
our Constitution were effectively governed by the strongest member. As
a general rule, members of such associations abandoned any pretense to
republican liberty in their obedience to the despotic power that secured
their union. But in preserving the sovereignty of its individual republican
members, the unification of the American states into one nation promises
the surest means by which a government of, by, and for the people can avoid
those dangers to which confederacies are prone.12
The accommodation between city and empire represented by the
national form proves critical to accountability and transparency. That is, if
our nation is so large that our representatives cannot understand or identify
with the passions, opinions, and interests of their constituents, then they
will not be able to represent their fellow citizens well. As Madison argues,
while our national representatives “must be raised to a certain number, in
order to guard against the cabals of a few,” they also “must be limited to a
certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude.”13
Moreover, by “enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the
representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and

11. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, No. 9, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed09.asp (accessed December 10, 2019).
12. Though Hamilton here draws on Montesquieu, his argument in Federalist Paper No. 9 actually goes much farther than its French inspiration, whose
model was closer in size to the classical city-state than to the comparatively massive American nation that the Constitution made possible. In other
words, the newest innovation of the new “science of politics” must be credited to America’s Founders and not Montesquieu.
13. James Madison, The Federalist Papers, No. 10, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp (accessed December 10, 2019).
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lesser interests.”14 The Constitution devised by our Founders thus aims to
form “a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests
being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.”15 A republican nation makes it unlikely that a national legislature
will be wholly indifferent to or ignorant of the welfare of parts of the confederacy they represent.
Similarly, if the constituents do not know well enough their elected officials then they will not be able to hold them accountable. They will either
not be able to trust them at all, or will trust them entirely too much.16 Without sufficient knowledge of their representatives, constituents will lose the
primary means by which they preserve leverage over politicians: the threat
of voting them out of office. As a result, they will sacrifice the political liberty
that is the hallmark of republican life. The size of our national form thus
supplies the necessary conditions of our freedoms.
The second iron-clad law of free politics, however, shows why the extension of such a confederacy cannot be infinite. After all, it is easy to see why
a community interested in its own survival should be larger than the citystates of ancient Greece, whose small size invited both foreign invasion
and domestic insurrection. But it is not so easy to see why there should be
limits to republican expansion. What prevents a confederacy of republics
from expanding indefinitely? Could there not be a republican empire, for
instance? Madison’s Federalist Paper No. 10 makes the case that republican governments, though capable of extending over vast areas, cannot be
limitless; the conditions for popular liberty—republicanism itself—demand
limits set by the political psychology on the basis of which republican politics are possible.17
The vitality of republican governments demands a citizenry dedicated to
the welfare of the community as a whole. But, as noted above, such dedication is circumscribed by the limits on the human ability to care genuinely
for the welfare of other human beings. The range of human affection for
others, the kind that can serve as the basis for trust or inspire devotional
self-sacrifice, is limited by nature to those few human beings to whom we
become genuinely attached, whom we know and trust, and for whose welfare we care deeply.

14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
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Of course, stable and viable political communities have to be larger than
a narrow circle of family and friends as the preceding section showed.18
Modern nation-states have attempted to bridge the gap between the
limited range of human affection possible and the massive size required
for a self-sufficient political community through civic education and the
socialization of their members. But the need for a robust dedication to the
common good, coupled with the natural limits on human knowledge and
affections, means that one cannot simply rely on a civic imagination formed
by teachers and textbooks to inspire civic devotion. What generally passes
for civics education today (when our public schools deign to teach it) will
not by itself excite our greatest efforts and energies on behalf of the nation.
This explains why the Constitution guarantees not only the sovereignty of
the states, but that they shall have a republican form as well.19 As Tocqueville nicely observes about the feelings that Americans have for the nation
generally and for their respective states:
The sovereignty of the Union is an abstract thing connected only to a small
number of external matters. The sovereignty of the state is felt by all the senses; it is understood without difficulty; every moment, it is seen in action. One is
new; the other was born with the people themselves…. The sovereignty of the
Union is a work of art. The sovereignty of the state is natural; it exists by itself,
without effort, like the authority of the father of a family.20

To the extent that our national body becomes united, it will be united
by extending the affection that citizens feel for their local communities to
the larger states of which they are a part. Tocqueville again usefully points
out what this requires:
[I]f, among confederated peoples, you want to create a common existence and
a true national government, it is absolutely necessary that their civilization be
homogeneous in nature. This necessity makes itself felt much more in confederations than in monarchies, because in order to be obeyed, government
has much more need for the support of the governed in the first than in the
second.21

18. On this point, see also Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. by Eduardo Nolla and trans. by James T. Schleifer (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,
2012), Vol. 2, Part 2, chs. 2–4, pp. 881–894.
19. United States Constitution, IV.4.
20. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1 Part 1, ch. 8, p. 269.
21. Ibid., p. 270.
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In other words, our republican nation must be bound by a shared civilization while also preserving the autonomy reserved for the states. Establishing
a homogeneous civilization among the nearly four million people who lived
along the Atlantic coast in the late 18th century was one thing. Preserving it among 330 million people who span a continent is something else
altogether. The political, economic, and religious diversity that naturally
follows from such a populous nation living across such varied regions may
well make it difficult to maintain the civilizational homogeneity necessary
to keep us together. And yet, it is precisely because this is a real danger for
a country of our size that we must tend carefully to our nation’s essentially
republican character lest we, under the illusions of progressivism, abandon
the preconditions of our freedoms.
Size matters greatly. Imperial republics, by dint of their great size and
internal diversity, exceed the ability of both their representatives and their
constituents to know, trust, and care for one another. They render inert
those psychological springs by which human beings remain concerned
about others’ rights and the well-being of their communities.
The Federalists’ commitment to a republican nation means that several large republican communities will exist within a larger community
dedicated to republican principles. Such an overlap between spheres of
republican self-government not only makes possible, but also requires
that populations with different political passions, economic interests, and
moral tastes live alongside each other. And this, oddly enough, is critical to
the preservation of republicanism because it is this kind of diversity that
increases the likelihood of the rule of reasoned law.
Thus, this third law, which posits that a republican nation will rule itself
rationally, is not just due to the fact, as Madison points out, that representatives from districts whose constituents embrace a wide range of opinions,
tastes, and interests will be free from local prejudice, and thus free to pursue
more sensible courses of action. Nor is it due solely to the political representation that refines our views, or to the fact that such large districts inhibit
the nefarious practices that can influence elections. The real cause is even
more fundamental. Unlike communities where membership is defined by
shared race, blood, language, or creed, nations are dedicated to the law as
a form of communal identity; members of a nation must view the law as
something above the particular and arbitrary traits that distinguish members from one another.
This elevation of the law not only necessitates the toleration of diverse
viewpoints, but also demands the consensus building—with its emphasis on
rational deliberation, compromise, and mutual trust—necessary to secure

June 2020 | 11
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a common good across peoples of different classes, races, and religious
beliefs. It is in this way that a republican nation makes it likely that it will
be governed by laws that are the product of rational deliberation.22 Empires,
tribes, families, religious communities, even ancient cities and medieval
republics do not traditionally cultivate tolerance of others or respect for
the law as a source of common identity over biological, tribal, and religious
ties. As Scruton points out, no other “bonding principles…for political solidarity” have been disclosed by history that could effectively preserve the
liberal values that, for the past two hundred years, have found their home
within the nation.
The fourth iron-clad law of free republics follows from the third: A republican nation must protect the rights of minorities in its midst and even foster
economic, religious, and political diversity. This finds its clearest expression
in Madison’s famous argument in Federalist Paper No. 10 for multiplying
factions as the means of controlling for their invidious effects. Prior to the
constitutional amendments aimed at protecting individual rights, Madison
argues for a substructure to our national polity that would support and
perpetuate the existence of those minority groups that are necessary to
and the hallmark of our liberty.
Madison’s argument here is simple. The more one multiplies factions, the
smaller and weaker individual factions are likely to be, at once making them
the potential enemies and allies of everyone else. This produces a dynamic
that decreases the likelihood of violence and injustice while enhancing the
odds of cooperation and fair play. This argument about justice draws from
an understanding of what one might call “political physics.” It reflects a scientific understanding of the different forces, and their relationship to each
other, that must be at work in any political community that hopes to secure
both political and private liberty for its citizens. As such, it recognizes as
legitimate the existence of different internal factions actuated by competing
interests and rival conceptions of the public good. Because the solution to
the dangers posed by factions requires their extensive multiplication, it is
necessary to establish a community large enough to accommodate a wide
and divergent populace while still adhering to those very real limits on the
human ability to know, trust, and care for other human beings. America’s
republican form is designed to balance this difficult combination.
22. Or as Tocqueville puts it: “What is understood by a republic in the United States is the slow and tranquil action of society on itself. It is an ordered state
actually based on the enlightened will of the people. It is a conciliatory government, where resolutions mature over a long time, are debated slowly
and are executed with maturity…. Above [the majority in a republic] in the moral world are found humanity, justice, and reason; in the political world,
vested rights. The majority recognizes these two barriers, and if it happens to cross them, it is because the majority has passions, like every man; and
like him, it can do evil while perceiving good.” Tocqueville, Democracy, Vol. 1, Part 2, ch. 8, p. 627.
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Hamilton’s promise in Federalist Paper No. 1 that the American Constitution will offer a novel solution to an enduring problem seems to be
fulfilled by The Federalists’ arguments for a republican nation. Such a nation,
which recognizes the sovereignty of the smaller republican states within
the larger republic that unites them, will adhere to the four iron-clad laws
of free republics. It will combine the liberty of the ancient Greek city with
the stability and security of an empire. It will promote the rule of law rooted
in rational reflection. It will protect minorities and promote the kind of
diversity necessary for combatting the dangers of factionalism. And it will
secure the conditions required for political transparency and accountability.
Such a defense of the nation-state supplies indispensable clarity about
what is at stake if such necessities are abandoned in the headlong rush to
liberate human beings to act however they wish—or to exceed the national
form with a view to unifying all of humanity. Contemporary critics of the
nation would do well to remind themselves of this original defense of the
American nation to see that contempt for “the other” or a mindless attachment to “one’s own” does not come close to exhausting the possible defenses
of the national form. Given the simplicity, clarity, and power of The Federalists’ argument on behalf of the republican nation, it bears wondering why
so many of the critics of the nation ignore or dismiss it.

Enemies of the Republican Form: Global
Humanitarianism and Identity Politics
The contemporary assault on republicanism, the oikophobia diagnosed
by Scruton noted above, has roots that run far deeper than the failure of our
high schools, colleges, and universities to teach American civics and political
history. To be sure, American “higher education” tends to foster disrespect for
any national form. It accepts, almost without question, the characterization
of the nation advanced by sociologist Ernest Gellner as a human association
understood entirely in ethnic and tribal terms.23 Once one accepts this premise,
it becomes easy to link the nation to uglier phenomena that seem to be on
the upswing today, such as racial sectarianism, ethnic populism, and vulgar
chauvinism; or to the nationalism embodied in the “virulent and toxic nationalisms of the twentieth century” that wreaked so much havoc upon the world.24

23. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2009).
24. Pierre Manent, Beyond Radical Secularism: How France and the Christian West Should Respond to the Islamic Challenge, Ralph C. Hancock, trans.
(South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2016), p. 111. (Originally published in France as Situation de la France, Group Artège, Éditions Desclée de
Brouwer, 2015).
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This anti-national attitude is aggravated by the fact that the academy routinely fails to acknowledge that the greatest atrocities of the modern world
have been perpetrated not by nations but by anti-national or transnational
movements, such as fascism and communism. Thus, the desire of Hitlerite
Germany to extend its Reich across Europe was driven less by a sense of
German national interests and more by utopian ideologies that promised
a new world based on racial hierarchy. Motivated by similarly impossible
goals, communist governments during the 20th century generated the
“untimely” deaths of nearly 100 million of their own citizens during times
of peace. That is more than all of the deaths incurred during the bloodiest
wars of the world’s bloodiest century. It is no surprise then that so many of
our young people graduate from college without learning that the spread
of liberal democracy and human rights, the abolition of slavery, the extension of the franchise to women, or the incredible innovation and material
prosperity of the past 200 years were the result of the coordinated efforts
of Western nations.
Global Humanitarianism. But the real roots of this anti-national
temptation are much older. Following George Orwell, Scruton contends
that this desire to distance the self from home and hearth is a pathology
to which political leftists in the West are especially prone. Preening
himself on his superior objectivity, this self-styled principled defender
of human rights “is, in his own eyes, a defender of enlightened universalism against local chauvinism.”25 In an effort to display his moral
selflessness for all to see, he takes as his motto W. B. Yeats’s memorable
lines: “Come, fix upon me that accusing eye./ I thirst for accusation.”26
This attack on the local and particular in the name of enlightened universalism makes its first dramatic appearance in Western civilization in
the French Revolution.
The leaders of the revolution were inspired to overturn throne and
altar—authorities that for centuries had forged a distinct national identity
for the French—by the progressive delusion that both the political world
and human nature could be fundamentally transformed. Indeed, the most
radical among them held out hope that the enduring social, political, moral,
and economic problems facing man could be resolved once and for all if
one simply discovered and installed the correct system, one scientifically

25. Scruton, England and the Need for Nations, p. 37.
26. From Yeats’s play, “The King of The Great Clock Tower,” (The MacMillan Company: New York, 1935), https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.
dli.2015.167642/2015.167642.The-King-Of-The-Great-Clock-Tower-Commentaries-And-Poems_djvu.txt (accessed December 4, 2019).
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deduced to “square the political circle.” For the Jacobins, this meant that
their Republic of Virtue could be secured by any means necessary, including
the use of “terror and tyranny in the vain effort to actualize what cannot be.”27
Despite (or perhaps even because of ) its spectacular failure, the political example of the French Revolution introduced Europe and the West to a
new habit of thought that in time would lead statesmen and citizens to think
almost instinctively about any solution to particular problems in universalist
terms only. It thus cultivated the demand for nothing short of perfect justice,
one untarnished by self-interest, calculation, or compromise. And because it
held out the hope for a fundamental transformation of the human condition,
this universalist or ideological way of thinking made possible those movements, like communism, fascism, and revolutionary nihilism, that, though
radically secular, looked to effect an essentially religious evolution of man’s
moral and political landscape.28 Today’s global humanitarian, though less
violent than his forebears, shares the genealogy of these secular religions and
seeks an equally utopian transformation of our political situation.
For instance, in their progressive outlook, global humanitarians view
national borders as the atavistic relics of a bygone age. Borders are, for them,
the products of force and fraud over which so many lives were thoughtlessly
squandered during the centuries of Western imperialism, colonialism, and
a 20th century of total wars. The diminution of these arbitrary boundaries
is thus indispensable to the universal and “perpetual peace” so necessary
to human dignity. The German philosopher Jurgen Habermas is the loudest among those calling for the overcoming of the nation. For Habermas,
the nation “is in the end an atavism, an anachronism. And it will survive
in diminished form only if it jettisons stubborn claims to sovereignty and
autonomy.” Such a diminished form will require “the evolutionary transfer of sovereign rights to an enhanced European identity” which will also
assume “joint fiscal, budgetary, and (redistributive) economic policy,”
harmonizing “social policy across the whole of Europe.” This evolutionary
process will, Habermas hopes, put “an end to the ‘fiction’ of national government” and “ridiculous national prejudices.”29

27. Martin Diamond, “The Revolution of Sober Expectations,” in William Schambra, ed., As Far as Republican Principles Will Admit: Essays By Martin
Diamond (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1992), p. 217.
28. For an outstanding analysis of secular religions, see Michael Burleigh’s masterful Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and Politics, From the Great
War to the War on Terror (New York: Harper Perennial, 2006), as well as Waller Newell’s Tyrants: A History of Power, Injustice, & Terror (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2016).
29. This gloss of Habermas’ position comes from Daniel J. Mahoney, The Idol of Our Age: How the Religion of Humanity Subverts Christianity (New York:
Encounter Books, 2018), pp. 116–118. Habermas’ arguments for such a trans- or supranational order can be found in his most recent work on this
subject: The Lure of Technology (New York: Polity Press, 2015).
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Of course, not all global humanitarians call for the outright erasure of national
borders. Nor do they openly argue for a global government to administer world
affairs. But in elevating matters of global concern over national self-interest,
in asserting the priority of international cooperation over national self-regard,
and in tarring as racist and xenophobic those who would insist on the political
importance of national borders, they follow Habermas and kneel at the altar of
the “secular religion of humanity.”30 Many European leaders, such as Angela
Merkel and the elites working for the U.N., appear to accept without question
the goodness of dangerously lax immigration policies.31 And Members of the
U.S. Congress openly call for the weakening or outright dismantling of those
institutions charged with protecting America’s national borders.32
While the enemies of the ancien regime in France drew inspiration
from the philosophic writings of Rousseau, and while the communists and
fascists following them took guidance from Marx’s Communist Manifesto
and the work of Fichte, Herder, and Gentile, respectively, today’s global
humanitarians effectively worship at the altar of Auguste Comte and his
book System of Positive Polity. Although few believers in global humanitarianism are likely to have read his book, Comte’s thinking has had an
outsized influence on modern sociology, on the subsequent study of the
social sciences, and on the generations of students produced by the modern
academy. One can thus locate the intellectual roots of the contemporary
distaste for local and national limits in the tacit and widespread acceptance
of this work’s singularly monstrous creation: the religion of humanity.
At the heart of this “religion” is an abstract vision of humanity with no
God or higher law above it, the worship of which commands us to unite
peacefully as individuals into a global community. To contemporary ears,
such a goal sounds harmless enough. But it is not. No work better diagnoses the nefarious effects of Comte’s religion of humanity on contemporary
moral and political discourse than Daniel J. Mahoney’s The Idol of Our
30. As quoted in Mahoney, The Idol of Our Age, p. 118.
31. Christopher Caldwell, “What Is Populism?: For Better and for Worse, a Democracy Movement,” Claremont Review of Books, Fall 2018, https://
claremontreviewofbooks.com/what-is-populism/ (accessed December 9, 2019).
32. During his candidacy for president, Julián Castro proposed reforms that would make illegal immigration a civil, instead of a criminal, violation and
would essentially dismantle the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE). See Julián Castro, “Putting People First,” Julián Castro
2020, https://issues.juliancastro.com/people-first-immigration/ (accessed December 9, 2019). Last summer, Representative Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez
(D–NY) likened immigration facilities to concentration camps. See Rich Lowry, “The Concentration Camp Smear,” National Review, June 18, 2019,
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-concentration-camp-comment-immigration-facilities/ (accessed December 9, 2019).
Resolution No. 73 of the platform of the Democratic Socialists, the activist group supporting the presidential candidacy of Senator Bernie Sanders (D–
VT), calls for the “[u]ninhibited transnational free movement of people, demilitarization of the US–Mexico border, abolition of ICE and CBP [Customs
and Border Protection] without replacement, decriminalization of immigration, full amnesty for all asylum seekers, and pathway to citizenship for all
non-citizen residents.” See, Democratic Socialists of America, DSA Resolutions for the 2019 Convention, https://www.dsausa.org/files/2019/06/2019Resolutions-Approved.pdf (accessed December 9, 2019).
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Age.33 According to Mahoney, Comte’s religion of humanity dissolves all
traditional boundaries and limits in favor of “love” for an abstract mankind.
Or, as Pierre Manent observes, global humanitarianism, which appears all
the more noble for being so other-directed, “involves a general scrambling
of the reference points from which human beings, as moral agents and free
citizens, take their bearings.”34 Because it prioritizes a concern for mankind,
the religion of humanity weakens those relations that prioritize some individuals over others, like “parent” and “child,” “sister” and “brother,” “friend”
and “lover,” “citizen” and “foreigner.” Naturally, the expectations and duties
that follow from these distinct relations and make us devoted to something
that transcends mere self-concern also disappear. Just as children would
come to owe their parents no more respect than they would a stranger, citizens would owe no special obedience to their country and its laws. By trying
to attach us to everyone, Comte attaches us to no one. This newfangled
religion takes the traditional hierarchies of family and country and the standards of natural right and divine law—hierarchies and standards that order
our relations with other human beings and direct individual self-interest
towards the service of broader and higher ends—and flattens them, draining
them of their political vitality, human meaning, and moral authority.
Comte’s religion of humanity asserts that the most fundamental human
reference point is the concern for one’s own good. This must be corrected,
according to Comte, as it is “dangerous” because it is particular and limiting and provides a powerful source for our attachment to exclusive goods
like family life, moral virtue, and civic freedom. Yet, what Comte and his
followers cannot see is that the concern for one’s own good is at the root of
the human desire to be a dedicated parent, sibling, or child. We are capable
of being good to others as they become an extension of our own good. Moreover, the concern for our own good motivates us to restrain the pursuit of
narrow self-interest for the sake of the common good—for one’s broader
good is to be connected to a community, state, and nation. And finally, the
concern for our own good is what inspires the arduous pursuit of moral
excellence. The morally excellent believe at bottom that their own good
(though that of others as well) will be served by that moral excellence. All
of the human goods that political life makes possible are rooted in various kinds of selfishness. This is why Comte must replace it as the primary
human concern with a diffuse “social feeling.”35
33. Daniel J. Mahoney, The Idol of Our Age: How the Religion of Humanity Subverts Christianity (New York: Encounter Books, 2018).
34. See Manent’s introduction to The Idol of Our Age, p. xii.
35. Ibid., p. 9.
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But this “social feeling” is incapable of generating any devotion to the
welfare of others by those who profess to feel it. Like the imperial form
discussed above, “society” and “humanity” are abstract concepts too broad
to speak to the limited range of the human capacity to know, trust, and care
for others. Without a moral, political, or spiritual horizon capable of drawing human beings outside of their self-interests narrowly construed, and
left with a formless humanity as their only “star and compass,” individuals
under this dispensation are hindered from loving anyone or anything in
particular, themselves included.
Despite both its progressive-sounding concerns for the rights of man
and its vague overlap with watered-down Christianity, there is nothing in
today’s “humanitarian ethic” that can effectively limit individual conduct
in the pursuit of such goals.36 The limiting restraints supplied by the republican national form (like concern for fellow citizens) are simply ignored or
dismissed. This may explain why members of the political and intellectual
elite in both America and Europe can attack so publicly the integrity of
particular national identities and the exclusive institutions, practices, and
borders that help preserve their shape. To this incoherence, one could add
another, one exposed by contemporary developments surrounding Brexit:
the rise in national self-regard among Western publics, and concern over
how governments in America and Europe handle the challenges of illegal
immigration. The problem revealed by these developments may be stated
as follows: While global humanitarianism seeks to extend the blessings
of liberalism to all, it fails to understand that these blessings can only be
manifested in discrete, coherent, particular communities—the kind of communities defined by national borders.
For instance, no defender of global humanitarianism would deny that
the liberalism they cherish also requires democracy. And it requires democracy because liberalism prioritizes the freedom of the individual will. But
the individual can only freely authorize a government to act on his behalf
by means of popular consensus. Democracy is thus the political means by
which liberalism respects and perpetuates its core principles. But to have
a democracy you need borders. As Marc Plattner observes,
An absence of firm borders and clear lines of jurisdiction may not be a problem
in empires or other political forms where governments are not accountable to

36. Mahoney, The Idol of Our Age, ch. 1.
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their citizens. But if the citizens are to govern, or at least to hold their governors accountable, it must be clear who is and is not included in the polity. And
it is hard to see how this can be accomplished without clear lines of demarcation indicating whose voices have the right to be counted.37

The realization of liberalism’s promise requires knowing who owes
what to whom, who practically shares in liberalism’s rights, and who can
be expected to defend and discharge the burdens and responsibilities associated with them. There is no way to exercise sovereignty, or even respect
the free expression of individuals, without knowing whose voices count
and whose voices do not count when manufacturing a consensus. The
need for exclusive borders and limited conceptions of citizenship begins
to emerge here.
This difficulty is compounded by the fact that democratic practice, that
is, simple rule of the majority, cannot determine by itself who is an insider
and who is an outsider. Who is “in” and who is “out” is determined prior to a
people acting together democratically. The American experience provides a
useful illustration of this point. Long before Thomas Jefferson penned the
Declaration’s golden passages about just government being derived from the
consent of the governed, Americans shared in common languages, religious
practices, social and political customs, and history. The colonists did not
choose these experiences for themselves; these experiences defined who
they were as a people, the kind who could come to authorize our republican
Constitution and legitimize our democratic practices.
Without these previously given reference points, democratic practices,
like elections, cannot identify the legitimate boundaries defining the majority of which those practices are to be the chief expression. This is because,
to quote Pierre Manent, “the principle of consent does not bring with it any
political form as such. The democratic principle does not contain its political effectiveness.”38 Simply put, any human association—a country, a sports
team, a family, a classroom—can run itself democratically. The proper size
or population of the association in question is not determined by democracy.
The criteria for those people who can originally authorize a community’s
democratic practices must be anchored in something outside of or anterior
to democracy, something that is not simply chosen, but given. Otherwise,
one encounters the kind of legitimacy deficit that currently plagues the EU’s
ruling class whose members understand themselves to be tied to, and bound
37. Marc F. Plattner, Democracy Without Borders? Global Challenges to Liberal Democracy (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), pp. 106–107.
38. Pierre Manent, “The Autumn of Nations,” Azure, No. 16 (Winter 2004), p. 41.
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by, no constituency in particular. And it explains the contortions that the
EU’s elite must undergo to block an all-Muslim Turkey from joining a (still)
Judeo-Christian West. In both cases, the EU’s elite refuse to acknowledge
that belonging to Europe means sharing in a history, customs, and religious
and political beliefs that were given and not rationally selected.
All of this means that liberal democracy can only effectively recognize
and defend the universalism at the heart of modern liberalism within a particular political, democratic context. The liberal universalism championed
by the global humanitarian is not opposed to democratic particularity; it
actually requires it. Its universal aspirations cannot be given shape or form
without instantiation in a discrete community and without being enlivened
by a particular people. This may sound like a paradox. But it is not. It merely
reflects the tension at the heart of all free political communities. On the
one hand, there is the human need to participate in something larger than
one’s self, to engage in that shared deliberation over what is truly just and
noble that defined political life for Aristotle. On the other hand, there is the
republican need for such a community to be small enough for its members
to know, trust, and care for one another.39 Fortunately for us, The Federalists’ argument for a large republic supplies the national form capable of
balancing this tension without sacrificing one pillar of it to the other. The
republican nation they designed combines the universal aspirations of the
nation with a commitment to the freedom and community of its particular members.
Identity Politics. While the enemies “from without” attack the particular and exclusive borders that make discrete nations possible, the criticism
of the nation leveled by those “from within” is more subtle. The enemies
of republicanism “from within” are first and foremost concerned with the
systems that oppress and marginalize others; as such they tend to fall within
the camp of identity politics. For the defender of identity politics, who takes
up the cause of groups defined by differences in race, ethnicity, gender, and
sexual orientation, our national form represents an oblique target as it is
tied to the systems that oppress and marginalize particular groups.
The problem posed to the national form by identity politics is simple:
For the identitarian there are no associations above the marginalized
group whose membership could confer greater dignity or moral authority
than that of the oppressed group. To acknowledge the existence of such an
authority would be to recognize that there is something higher than group
39. For a beautiful statement on this tension, see Heather Pangle, “Liberalism and Nationalism,” National Affairs, No. 43 (Spring 2020), https://www.
nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/liberalism-and-nationalism (accessed May 21, 2020).
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identity capable of bestowing legitimacy and dignity on its members. It
would mean recognizing that the marginalization that defines the oppressed
group is not the alpha and omega of domestic life. It would mean conceding
that the injustices decried by identitarians might, at least theoretically, be
subordinate to other higher or more fundamental concerns of the political
community. But this would be unacceptable. As a result, identity politics
leaves no room for a national form the good of which can effectively subordinate factional conflicts and unite identity groups.
Pointing this out does not imply a stance on claims made about racial,
economic, religious, or social marginalization. It only shows the anti-national logic behind identity politics. Again, that logic holds that the principle
of group identity, defined by marginalization and oppression, must necessarily replace the republicanism at the heart of our nation’s identity. Of
course, when stated this way, it is fair to wonder what sense it makes to view
a person’s status as victim or oppressed as the source of his or her moral
authority. For it would be absurd for the identitarian to hope for and dedicate himself to the continued existence of the marginalization that defines
his group (and which he decries) in the same way that the civic republican
hopes for and dedicates himself to the perpetuation of the republic that
secures his dignity.
And yet, by protecting from oppression those members of a group whose
identities are defined by traits that set them apart from their fellow citizens,
the identitarian valorizes those accidental, arbitrary traits that are given by
chance. In receiving special recognition by the law, characteristics like race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and so on are invested with a moral
legitimacy that is at odds with the universalizing principles our republican
nation strives to embody. In the identitarian’s moral universe, the more one
possesses those distinguishing marginalizing traits, the better; the greater
the oppression, the greater the moral authority that can be brought to bear
against the forces of oppression. The grounds for grievances must therefore
be preserved or that moral authority will be sacrificed. And this would be
an anathema to the identitarian. The subordination of the national form
to the concerns of the sub-national group must therefore be maintained.
Such a dynamic, at any rate, seems to explain the appeal of the theory of
intersectionality to identitarians. Intersectionality means that the more
categories of marginalization to which a person belongs, the more moral
authority he or she possesses. For example, a female, African, Muslim
immigrant to America has considerably more moral authority than a white
woman. Intersectionality holds out the promise of multiplying marginalization, thus increasing claims against the oppressing systems and forces.
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As the cross-cutting cleavages of oppression multiply, ever new identities
are formed, and the groups at the heart of identity politics get smaller and
smaller. The atomization of public life that this fosters further erodes the
ties that bind us together as a community and erects new barriers to our
ability to know, trust, understand, and care for each other.
Both identitarians and global humanitarians show us what we risk when
we fail to preserve respect for the limits that define our republican nation.
The inability to think or speak seriously about the importance of these
limits makes us vulnerable to foreign conquest from without and to the
divisiveness of identity politics from within.

Conclusion
Contemporary attacks on the nation by global humanitarians and advocates of identity politics have elicited their share of responses in defense of
the American nation. These responses tend to emphasize America’s distinctive contributions to the cause of human liberty, world peace, and material
and technological progress.40 While these offer important pushback to those
attacks, these responses are largely silent about the science of politics at the
heart of our nation’s particular Founding. The Federalists’ argument from
what I have called “political physics,” an argument justifying both the need
for and an attachment to our particular republican nation, goes unstated
and unappreciated.
Dedication to America’s national form is not about the thoughtless valorizing of one’s own that is so often at the heart of uglier forms of nationalism.
It is about an understanding of the critical role played by size, scope, and
dimensionality in the creation of stable and secure communities, the emergence of a citizenry attached to the public good, the rule of reasoned law,
the preservation of diversity and minorities, and political transparency
and accountability, the very things that critics of the nation tacitly seek
to preserve. Critics of the national form thus fail to appreciate the conditions necessary to preserve the rights they claim to cherish. They also fail to
understand that the ability to grasp the virtues of the national form, defend
their preservation, and respect their power does not require being a liberal
or a conservative. Nor does it require a chauvinistic defense of America’s
past, or even patriotism. It simply requires an openness to the axioms of
the new science of civic republicanism and the ability to see that the type
40. Among the spate of works to address nations and nationalism over the past year, see especially Yoram Hazony, The Virtue of Nationalism (New York:
Basic Books, 2018), and Richard Lowry, The Case for Nationalism (New York: Broadside Books, 2019).
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of regime that is desired will determine certain features that must entail in
order for it to exist and persevere. To be sure, America has been indispensable to the cause of human liberty at home and abroad over the past two
centuries. But it is its science of civic republicanism—the self-conscious
articulation of this political physics—as much as its unique history, that
makes America such an indispensable nation.
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